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Redefi ning Periphery: Offshore Finance, 
Peripheral States and the World Economy
Dimitris Katsikas, Lecturer of International 
and European Political Economy, University of Athens
Abstract 
This article seeks to examine the changing dynamics between the periphery and the core of the world economy. Small, peripheral states have assumed 
an increasingly important role in recent decades by offering fi nancial services 
to an increasing and geographically expanding range of corporate entities and 
wealthy individuals. These Offshore Financial Centres (OFCs) or tax havens, 
offer a service, which often has negative consequences for non-OFC countries 
at the core of the global economy. Despite pressure from the latter, these small 
states at the periphery of the global state system are able to continue their 
operation unabated. This is possible because in a world of growing technological 
interconnectedness and capital mobility these states are able to employ the one 
resource they possess that has no limits: their legal sovereignty, that is, their 
right to write and enact law. By effectively commercializing their sovereignty 
small states are able to offer “juridical relocation”, a valuable service to wealthy 
individuals and companies around the world, which in turn employ them as a 
core piece in their intricate global wealth managing networks. 
KEYWORDS: Offshore Financial Centres, Tax Havens, Periphery, Legal 
Sovereignty, Capital Mobility, Shadow Banking 
Επαναπροσδιορίζοντας την Περιφέρεια: Εξωχώριες 
Χρηματοπιστωτικές Συναλλαγές και Κράτη 
της Περιφέρειας στην Παγκόσμια Οικονομία
Δημήτρης Κατσίκας, Λέκτορας υ.δ., Διεθνούς 
και Ευρωπαϊκής Πολιτικής Οικονομίας, Πανεπιστήμιο Αθηνών
Περίληψη
Το άρθρο αυτό επιχειρεί να εξετάσει την μεταβαλλόμενη δυναμική της σχέσης μεταξύ της περιφέρειας και του κέντρου της παγκόσμιας οικονομίας. Τις τε-
λευταίες δεκαετίες, μικρά κράτη της περιφέρειας έχουν αναλάβει έναν ολοένα και 
πιο σημαίνοντα ρόλο στην παγκόσμια οικονομία, προσφέροντας μια σειρά χρηματο-
πιστωτικών υπηρεσιών σε μια πληθώρα επιχειρήσεων και ευκατάστατων ιδιωτών ο 
αριθμός και η γεωγραφική ταυτότητα των οποίων συνεχώς επεκτείνονται. Αυτά τα 
Εξωχώρια Χρηματοπιστωτικά Κέντρα ή φορολογικοί παράδεισοι, προσφέρουν υπη-
ρεσίες οι οποίες συχνά έχουν αρνητικές επιπτώσεις στις οικονομίες των χωρών του 
κέντρου. Ωστόσο, παρά την πίεση των τελευταίων, τα κράτη αυτά της περιφέρει-
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ας συνεχίζουν να λειτουργούν χωρίς σοβαρά προβλήματα. Αυτό καθίσταται εφικτό 
γιατί σε ένα κόσμο υψηλής τεχνολογικής διασύνδεσης και ελευθερίας κινήσεων 
των κεφαλαίων αυτά τα κράτη μπορούν να χρησιμοποιήσουν αποτελεσματικά έναν 
πόρο που ξεπερνάει τους περιορισμούς του μεγέθους τους: την νομική εθνική κυ-
ριαρχία τους, δηλαδή το δικαίωμα τους να δημιουργούν και να εφαρμόζουν τους 
δικούς τους νόμους. Χρησιμοποιώντας ουσιαστικά την εθνική κυριαρχία τους σας 
εμπορικό ανταγωνιστικό πλεονέκτημα, τα κράτη αυτά προσφέρουν την δυνατότητα 
μιας νομικής μετακίνησης της έδρας των επιχειρήσεων και των ιδιωτών, οι οποίοι 
εκμεταλλεύονται την δυνατότητα αυτή τοποθετώντας τα κράτη αυτά στο κέντρο των 
παγκόσμιων δικτύων που χρησιμοποιούν για την διαχείριση του πλούτου τους. 
ΛΕΞΕΙΣ-ΚΛΕΙΔΙΑ: Εξωχώρια Χρηματοπιστωτικά Κέντρα, Φορολογικοί Παράδει-
σοι, Περιφέρεια, Νομική Εθνική Κυριαρχία, Ελευθερία Κινήσεως Κεφαλαίων, 
Σκιώδες Τραπεζικό Σύστημα
1. Introduction
The fi nancial crisis wreaked havoc to the global fi nancial system and led to the most severe economic crisis since the interwar years. The prompt 
intervention of governments and central banks averted the collapse of the global 
fi nancial system. However, the enormous cost of these interventions derailed 
fi scal policy and prepared the ground for the current debt crisis. The policy 
response, particularly in Europe, was the endorsement of an austerity policy 
programme, which however, has plunged Europe into recession for the second 
time in a period of three years, making the task of raising public (tax) revenues 
all the more diffi cult. In these circumstances, the search for alternative sources 
of public revenues in order to facilitate fi scal adjustment and avoid burdening 
further the large mass of middle-to-low income tax-payers, have catapulted the 
issues of tax evasion and tax avoidance to the forefront of public policy debate, 
particularly in countries that undergo strict fi scal consolidation programmes.1 
The so-called “Lagarde list” affair, which gripped public opinion in Greece 
during the autumn of 2012, is a case in point. The list contains the names of 
Greek taxpayers with deposit accounts at HSBC’s branch in Switzerland; its 
mishandling by the Ministry of Finance, which failed to make any meaningful 
use of the list, even for informal investigation purposes, led to accusations of a 
political cover-up, which provoked an intense political clash and has consequently 
led to parliamentary and judicial inquiries.2 At the same time, the efforts in 
recent weeks by the British and French governments to reveal tax avoidance 
practices by major multinational companies (MNCs) such as Amazon, Google 
and Starbucks and oblige them to pay a corporate tax bill commensurate with 
the scope of economic activities these companies undertake in their jurisdictions, 
has been making headlines in international media.3
These incidents while demonstrating the heightened interest of national 
authorities in the issues of tax evasion and avoidance, they also testify to their 
diffi culties in tackling these problems. In a sense, this is truly astonishing given that 
the bulk of activities related to tax evasion and tax avoidance, take place through 
small states, usually situated in distant, isolated locations or in the far reaches of 
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the periphery of big individual countries or continents. Given the substantial fi scal 
consequences for large developed, but also developing countries, it is truly puzzling 
how these fi nancial centres continue to operate unabated. The puzzle becomes even 
more intriguing when one takes into account the substantial campaign against tax 
havens that major international organizations such as the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) or the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) and 
its successor the Financial Stability Board (FSB) have embarked on in recent years. 
What is more, the international pressure on tax havens increased further in the 
aftermath of the global fi nancial crisis, with the G20 identifying the issue as a top 
priority for restoring transparency and stability in the global fi nancial system.4 
Although signifi cant progress has been made, given the terms of the mandate 
and the policy options and tools employed by the international community and 
endorsed by the G20, many analysts adopt a pessimistic view when it comes to 
the outcomes of these multilateral initiatives (Palan et al., 2010; Rixen, 2012). 
This pessimism is corroborated by recent research, which shows that despite the 
onslaught of multilateral initiatives in recent years tax havens have been able to 
continue their operations and in some case expand both their activities and their 
client base (Sharman, 2012).
The answer to this empirical puzzle is that contrary to images of tax havens as 
small peripheral entities that operate outside the global economy, they are in fact a 
central part of the global fi nancial system. The growing integration of world markets 
through technological innovation and crucially, capital mobility, have altered the 
ability of remote, small jurisdictions to participate in the world economy and most 
importantly in the global fi nancial system. In this sense, traditional measures of the 
concept of peripheral states such as size, domestic material resources and geographical 
position are misleading. In a world of growing technological interconnectedness and 
capital mobility, small, peripheral states are able to employ the one resource they 
possess that has no limits: their sovereignty. By effectively commercializing their 
sovereignty small states are able to offer “juridical relocation”, a valuable service to 
wealthy individuals and companies around the world, which in turn employ them 
as a core piece in their intricate global wealth managing networks. 
The article is organized as follows. In the fi rst section, the concept of 
tax havens will be introduced and their increasing signifi cance for the global 
fi nancial system will be demonstrated. Next, a theoretical discussion will 
develop the argument about the changed conceptualization of periphery in a 
world of technological interconnectedness and capital mobility. Another section 
will provide some empirical evidence about the central position of offshore 
fi nance in the global fi nancial system, through a brief examination of the role of 
offshore fi nancial centers in the recent global fi nancial crisis. A fi nal section will 
summarize and conclude the article. 
2. Offshore Financial Centres and the Global 
Financial System
Providing a defi nition for offshore fi nance is not easy. Preferential Tax Regimes (PTRs), tax havens and offshore fi nancial centres are all labels 
that have been in use for many years and their differences are not always easy 
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to identify. Thus, for example, PTRs are found in many developed and large 
developing countries, their pronounced objective being to offer preferential tax 
and regulatory treatment in order to attract foreign business. In this sense, PTRs 
could be thought of as an instrument of industrial policy, which primarily aims 
to attract Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in manufacturing and other “real 
economy” activities in order to raise national income and employment. However, 
often PTRs are used not to attract real business activities but rather to help 
non-resident companies and individuals lower their tax burden. As a result, it is 
often very diffi cult to distinguish in practice a PTR from a tax haven, the latter 
generally thought to be intentionally enacting legislation that aims to offer tax 
advantages and protection to non-resident corporate entities and individuals. 
Such a defi nition of tax havens however, makes it equally diffi cult to distinguish 
them from Offshore Financial Centres (OFCs). According to the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), offshore fi nance is “the provision of fi nancial services 
by banks and other agents to non-residents” (IMF 2000). Accordingly, an OFC 
could be thought of as “any fi nancial centre where offshore activity takes place” 
(IMF, 2000). However, it is obvious that it is very diffi cult to distinguish between 
offshore fi nancial centres, which use fi nancial activities as an instrument to 
facilitate tax evasion and/or tax avoidance and those that offer a wide range 
of “legitimate” fi nancial services, which may or may not offer tax and other 
regulatory advantages. What is more, fi nancial services to non-residents are 
offered in many fi nancial centres that would otherwise be considered “onshore”. 
Thus, for example, London and New York are considered major OFCs, since 
they offer a wide range of fi nancial services to non-residents. More generally, 
in recent years the liberalization of capital mobility and the gradual abolition 
of regulatory obstacles in fi nancial services have made the provision of fi nancial 
services to non-residents possible in literally all fi nancial jurisdictions. 
Therefore, and in order to avoid the conceptual diffi culties of distinguishing 
between OFCs and tax havens, this article will use the terms interchangeably as 
long as jurisdictions fulfi l the following criteria (IMF, 2000):
(a) Jurisdictions that have relatively large numbers of fi nancial institutions 
engaged primarily in business with non-residents;
(a) Financial systems with external assets and liabilities out of proportion 
to domestic fi nancial intermediation designed to fi nance domestic econo-
mies; and 
(a) More popularly, centres which provide some or all of the following ser-
vices: low or zero taxation; moderate or light fi nancial regulation; bank-
ing secrecy and anonymity. 
These criteria are designed to single out jurisdictions, which specialize in 
providing services to non-residents; that is the bulk of their activity is geared 
towards non-residents. This is a tell-tell sign of a tax haven since major 
international fi nancial centres such as London, New York or Tokyo, are not 
solely or primarily geared towards servicing non-residents.5 A tax haven or OFC 
specialize exclusively in providing services to non-residents, this why the size 
of their fi nancial system is generally substantially out of proportion with what 
the needs of the domestic economy would call for. This in turn means that a 
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large part of the fi nancial transactions taking place through OFCs are virtual, 
in the sense that they do represent actual, physical transactions taking place 
in these jurisdictions; these transactions are made elsewhere and they are only 
“booked” in OFCs, so that they can benefi t from the tax and other regulatory 
advantages these jurisdictions offer. This brings us to the last and arguably, 
most important point, which is related to the kind of services these jurisdictions 
offer, which usually is very low or zero taxation and regulation, combined with 
very strong legal provisions for the protection of the identity of their clients.6 
This combination is of course what enrages other countries and makes OFCs 
a target of multilateral initiatives for their regulation. Through OFCs and tax 
havens wealthy individuals from other countries, as well as corporate entities 
including MNCs, have the ability to reroute their transactions, hiding thus 
taxable income from their national taxation authorities and/or eschewing 
regulatory requirements requested by their domestic regulatory authorities. 
Table 1 presents two lists that were compiled by the OECD and the FSF, 
listing jurisdictions characterized as tax havens and offshore fi nancial centres 
respectively. Although the language regarding the characterization and 
cooperation with international authorities of some of these jurisdictions has 
changed over time, these lists are indicative of the type of jurisdictions that 
specialize in offshore fi nancial activities.
Table 1. List of Tax Havens/ Offshore Financial Centres
Jurisdiction OECD* FSF**
1 Andorra • •
2 Anguilla • •
3 Antigua & Barbuda • •
4 Aruba • •
5 Bahamas • •
6 Bahrain • •
7 Barbados • •
8 Belize • •
9 Bermuda • •
10 British Virgin Islands • •
11 Cayman Islands • •
12 Cook Islands • •
13 Costa Rica •
14 Cyprus • •
15 Dominica •
16 Gibraltar • •
17 Grenada •
18 Guernsey, Sark & Alderney • •
19 Hong Kong •
20 Ireland •
perifereia t.2.indd   63 22/2/2013   3:54:46 μμ
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 21/02/2020 06:44:15 |
[64] ΠΕΡΙΦΕΡΕΙΑ 
21 Isle of Man • •
22 Jersey • •
23 Lebanon •
24 Liberia •
25 Lichtenstein • •
26 Luxembourg •
27 Macao •
28 Malaysia •
29 Maldives •
30 Malta • •
31 Marshall Islands • •
32 Mauritius • •
33 Monaco • •
34 Montserrat •
35 Nauru • •
36 Netherlands Antilles • •
37 Niue • •
38 Palau
39 Panama • •
40 Saint Kitts & Nevis • •
41 Saint Lucia • •
42 Saint Vincent & the Grenadines • •
43 Samoa • •
44 San Marino •
45 Seychelles • •
46 Singapore •
47 Switzerland •
48 Tonga •
49 Turks & Caicos Islands • •
50 US Virgin Islands •
51 Vanuatu • •
Source: OECD 1998, 2000; FSF 2000.
* This original OECD list in 1998 identifi ed 47 possible tax havens. OECD’s 2000 report listed 
35 tax havens; six were still acknowledged as tax havens (and are included here) but they were 
kept of the list because they had committed to cooperate with the OECD. Another six were 
excluded from the list because of a change in the defi nition of what constitutes a tax haven. The 
OECD has in the meantime decided that three jurisdictions (Barbados, Maldives and Tonga) 
should not be included anymore in the list. In its latest report (May 2012), the OECD reports 
that all jurisdictions have committed to implementing its tax standard, which effectively is a 
standard about transparency and information exchange.
**The FSF list contains 42 jurisdictions characterized as offshore fi nancial centres. The 
jurisdictions were grouped into three categories refl ecting their perceived quality of supervision 
and perceived degree of co-operation with other national and international authorities. 
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It probably comes as no surprise that most of the jurisdictions that satisfy 
these criteria are to be found in small, remote countries, which typically exist at 
the periphery of developed countries such as the United Kingdom (Jersey, Isle 
of Man, Guernsey) or the United States (Cayman Islands, Barbados, Bahamas, 
Dominica, Turks and Caicos Islands, Belize, etc.) and at the outer fringes of 
continents like Europe (Malta, Cyprus, Gibraltar), Asia (Hong Kong, Singapore, 
Macao), and Oceania (Vanuatu, Tonga, Nauru, Marshall Islands, Samoa). Even 
when these jurisdictions are centrally located (as is the case in Europe with 
Monaco, Luxembourg, Liechtenstein, Switzerland and San Marino), these are 
small countries and/or administrative regions which have traditionally existed 
at the periphery of the mainstream political developments and economic activity 
of their country and/or continent. These are typically very small states with very 
low population, extremely limited domestic economic and natural resources and 
virtually no geopolitical signifi cance. For example, it is characteristic that of 
the forty-two jurisdictions identifi ed by the FSF as OFCs, thirty-three have a 
population of less than a million. As it will be shown in the next section, in view 
of their handicap in the global economic competition game, these states have 
opted to use their one valuable asset, their ability to write law, as a tool to attract 
fi nancial business.
Despite their limited size, population and natural resources, these states 
have been able to play an increasingly important role in the global economy, by 
becoming an integral part of the global fi nancial system. Tables 2 and 3 display 
the total banking assets and liabilities of the top thirty reporting jurisdictions 
(by volume of assets and liabilities) respectively. 
Table 2. External Positions of Banks in all Currencies vis-à-vis all 
Sectors in Individual Reporting Countries Assets ($ billions, June 2012)
Country* Assets
United Kingdom 5,640
Japan 3,165
United States 3,139
Germany 2,414
France 2,278
Cayman Islands 1,429
Netherlands 1,122
Hong Kong 953
Singapore 889
Luxembourg 732
Switzerland 718
Belgium 682
Japanese Offshore Market (JOM) 677
Italy 652
Spain 530
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Ireland 501
Canada 458
Sweden 446
United States International Banking Facilities 
(IBFs) 433
Finland 430
Australia 378
Austria 377
Bahamas 336
Jersey 270
Chinese Taipei 225
Guernsey 190
Norway 175
Denmark 165
Bahrain 145
Greece 142
Source: Bank of International Settlements
* With bold are designated countries that are included in at least in one of the OECD/ FSF 
lists. With italics are offshore regimes explicitly designed as such within the jurisdictions of the 
United States and Japan.
Table 3. External Positions of Banks in all Currencies vis-à-vis 
all Sectors in Individual Reporting Countries Liabilities 
($ billions, June 2012)
Country* Liabilities
United Kingdom 5814
United States 3576
France 2041
Germany 1866
Cayman Islands 1473
Netherlands 1387
Japan 1300
Singapore 949
Switzerland 815
Italy 796
Hong Kong 715
Australia 708
Sweden 634
Belgium 630
Spain 599
Finland 583
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United States International Banking Facilities 
(IBFs) 556
Luxembourg 539
Ireland 422
Canada 360
Bahamas 331
Japanese Offshore Market (JOM) 288
Denmark 288
Austria 243
Norway 242
Jersey 232
South Korea 229
Bahrain 143
Brazil 142
Guernsey 136
Chinese Taipei 130
Source: Bank of International Settlements
* With bold are designated countries that are included in at least in one of the OECD/ FSF 
lists. With italics are offshore regimes explicitly designed as such within the jurisdictions of the 
United States and Japan.
According to the data presented above, ten of these small states are among 
the thirty largest fi nancial centres in the world. Indeed, in terms of assets, the 
Cayman Islands seem to be the sixth largest fi nancial centre globally. Of course, 
some of the OFCs in tables 2 and 3, are countries such as Switzerland, Hong 
Kong, Singapore and Ireland, which have a substantial domestic economy, 
they offer a wider array of fi nancial services, with real value-added and should 
perhaps not be considered in the same category as other OFCs.7 Even if one 
excludes such states however, the results are still astonishing, as tiny islands 
like Jersey and Guernsey, with less than 100,000 inhabitants seem to be more 
important fi nancial centres than economic powers such as Brazil, India, Mexico, 
South Africa, Norway, Denmark and South Korea.8 To take a different measure, 
according to BIS fi gures, bank deposits in offshore centres in June 2012 totalled 
$3.9 trillion; by comparison the respective amount for the United States, Japan, 
Australia, Canada and New Zealand collectively was $4.7 trillion and for the 
Euro-area $5.8 trillion.9 In total, according to BIS data, offshore fi nancial centres 
hold approximately 18% of global bank deposits. These astonishing fi gures 
notwithstanding, what is even more astonishing is the fact that these numbers 
underestimate the true signifi cance of OFCs in today’s global fi nancial system. 
This is because not all OFCs report information on banking activities, and more 
importantly, an increasing number of fi nancial transactions take place outside 
the traditional banking system, through private trusts, hedge funds and a host 
of other entities of the so-called shadow banking system. Thus, while the fi gures 
concerning the deposits mentioned above are impressive, they only refer to cash 
deposits and do not take into account other forms of wealth such as shares, 
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bonds, real estate, gold, etc. In their effort to estimate the total wealth that may 
be located or channelled through OFCs, Palan et al. (2010), review a number of 
studies and report fi gures that range from $8 - $12 trillion. 
Even these fi gures however, do not provide the whole picture, as OFCs play 
also a central role in corporate tax strategies, particularly those of MNCs. It seems 
that approximately 30% of all FDI is invested or passes through OFCs (Palan 
et al. 2010), while OFCs also play an integral part in MNCs’ transfer pricing 
strategies. While accurate global estimates are not available, data from individual 
countries show that intra-fi rm trade makes up an increasing share of global trade 
(Dunning and Lundan, 2008). Based on such evidence a recent OECD report 
estimates intra-fi rm trade at approximately 30% of global trade (OECD 2010). 
In this context, transfer pricing, that is, the manipulation of the trading prices 
between different affi liates of the same MNC in order to exploit differences in tax 
regimes across countries, has become an increasingly important phenomenon. 
According to a 2010 survey of Ernst & Young covering twenty-fi ve markets and 
643 MNCs, 30% of parent companies tax directors consider transfer pricing as 
the most important tax issue, while 74% considered it a crucial or very important 
consideration for the next two years (Ernst & Young 2010). Finally, it is also 
worth mentioning that the discussion above has focused on the manipulation of 
wealth and income transactions produced by legal economic activities. However, 
this is again only part of the picture, as these fi gures do not include illicit money 
transactions. According to a recent report by the United Nations Offi ce on Drugs 
and Crime, the proceeds from crime are estimated in 2009 at 3.6% of global GDP 
or $2.1 trillion, while amounts laundered are estimated at 2.7% of global GDP 
or $1.6 trillion (UNODC, 2011). OFCs are a key component in the global money 
laundering mechanism of proceeds from criminal activities. Therefore, it is not 
surprising that in the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) 
of the United States Department of State for 2012, no less than eighteen OFCs 
are reported as major money laundering centres. 
3. Redefi ning Periphery in the Global Financial System 
From the previous section, it is clear that OFCs and/or tax havens are playing a signifi cant part in the operation of the global economy. This development has 
signifi cant negative repercussions for other countries; the operation of OFCs leads 
to the loss of considerable amounts of tax revenue for non-OFC jurisdictions,10 it fa-
cilitates the laundering of illicit money from criminal activities and very importantly 
(and not realized until the recent fi nancial crisis) threatens the stability of the global 
fi nancial system. The obvious empirical puzzle then, is how these small, peripheral 
states are able to continue these operations seemingly unabated. 
Traditionally, the core-periphery dichotomy in the study of international 
relations has been characterized by an implicit categorization of states, where 
the core comprises powerful states, which dominate international affairs and 
impose their will on weak peripheral states. In this sense, the conceptualization 
of periphery has been tied up with the concept of state power in international 
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relations. State power in turn has been largely dominated by realism’s concep-
tualization of power “as the ability of one state to use material resources to get 
another state to do what it otherwise would not do” (Barnett and Duvall, 2005:2). 
According to traditional realist approaches, these material resources typically 
comprise the size of its territory and population, its natural resources, its level 
of economic and technological development and most importantly, its military 
capabilities. The sum of such material resources determines state power, which 
in turn determines the position of the state in the hierarchy of the world state 
system (Waltz, 1979). It is worth noting, that this understanding of state power 
and the consequent segregation of states into a classifi cation of power, has also 
played a key role in the analysis of the international political economy. Thus, 
for example, it was a key component in many of the different strands of depend-
ency and neo-Marxist theories, which emerged in the aftermath of the dissolu-
tion of the great empires in the post-war period and which explicitly sought to 
analyse global political and economic affairs under the prism of a core-periphery 
dichotomy (Baran, 1957; Franck, 1967; Wallerstein, 1974). While developments 
in recent decades have undermined both the credence of dependency theories 
and the dominance of realism, the idea that material resources such as the size 
and sophistication of the domestic market provide a power advantage in the 
global economy is still a dominant one in current debates on global economic 
governance. Sophisticated realist-inspired approaches argue that such material 
resources offers substantial bargaining advantages in global economic govern-
ance negotiations (Gruber, 2000; Simmons, 2001; Drezner, 2007). 
The validity of such arguments notwithstanding, the rise of OFCs has dem-
onstrated that the constraints imposed on states by the scarcity of material re-
sources can, to some degree, be overcome in an environment of technological in-
terconnectedness and capital mobility. The ability to communicate and transact 
across borders instantly and at very low cost, combined with the increasing lib-
eralization of capital movements in recent decades have transformed the global 
economy. The multinational company has risen to the position of the dominant 
economic entity, a development, which as we saw above has changed dramati-
cally the nature of global trade. Global production and trade patterns create 
a complex web of economic transactions, in the midst of which lies an equally 
complex fi nancial system. This fl urry of transnational activity has meant that 
increasingly, several aspects of everyday life, particularly in the economic realm, 
are operating in the context of a functional geography, which often is at odds 
with the territorial geography of political authority (O’Brien 1991; Neuer 1998; 
Kobrin 2002). It is the exigencies of this functional geography, which give rise 
to a new power resource that is equally abundant and available in every nation-
state, however small or peripheral: legal sovereignty, or the sovereign right to 
write and enact law. As companies and individuals transact increasingly across 
borders, they seek out jurisdictions that offer them advantages both in carrying 
out these transactions and in safeguarding the income they earn on them. In 
this context there is a risk that states will engage in competitive deregulation in 
order to attract foreign investment. 
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While there is still disagreement over the degree to which a “race to the 
bottom” is taking place in terms of regulatory standards in different economic 
sectors (Abbott and Snidal, 2009), there is no doubt that international tax 
competition is an increasingly signifi cant phenomenon (OCED 1998). The 
proliferation and growth of tax havens and OFCs in recent decades provides the 
most defi nitive evidence of this development. Tax havens and OFCs differ from 
other types of competitive deregulation, in that their objective is not to attract 
business away from other jurisdictions; not real business anyway. The extremely 
small size, the dearth of natural, human and other economic resources and the 
geographical remoteness of many of these peripheral states means that in many 
cases it is not possible to attract typical FDI fl ows. In the case of small, periph-
eral tax havens real economic activity is not relocated; rather the “principal at-
traction of tax havens and the main cause for their spectacular success lie in 
their ability to provide protection from national regulation and taxation without 
the need to physically relocate to the host country” (Palan, 2000: 163).11 What 
is relocated is the juridical residence of the transacting parties: companies and 
individuals relocate their legally acknowledged place of residence for some pur-
poses in jurisdictions, which offer low or nil taxation, secrecy and light regula-
tory requirements, without however having to relocate physically their activities 
or business to these jurisdictions. This in turn is possible because of the denial of 
the legal unity of the subject (Palan, 2002). According to Palan, states have been 
able to manage the tension between the insulation of the state in law and the in-
ternationalization of capital, already evident since the 19th century, by allowing 
the (fi ctional) separation of the legal subject (Palan, 2002). This allows individu-
als and companies to be at the same time in different (legal) places, a peculiar 
situation which however offers them the great advantages of calculated ambigu-
ity, such as enjoying “the advantages of ownership while divesting themselves of 
the liabilities, borrowing without taking on debt, simultaneously reporting high 
profi ts and none at all, and ‘round-tripping’ domestic capital as foreign invest-
ment (Sharman, 2010: 2). In this context, it is not surprising to discover that 
the majority of companies that reside in OFCs and tax havens are really “shell” 
companies, that is, companies with no real substance, economic activity or even 
employees; they exist only in name in a juridical plane in order to confer to their 
owners the advantages on offer by the OFCs. 
This complex web of legal and economic interlinkages between the offshore 
world and onshore entities and individuals goes a long way towards explaining 
why small peripheral states such as Cayman Islands, Mauritius and Turks and 
Caicos islands can go on playing such a signifi cant role in the global fi nancial 
system, despite the negative consequences that this can have for their much 
larger and powerful neighbours. In the fi rst instance, this transnational web 
has created powerful interest constituencies that strive for its survival. These 
constituencies comprise the corporate entities and wealthy individuals that 
reside physically on the shore, but which gain tremendously by the existence of 
the offshore. In a sense, the confl ict between tax havens and other countries is 
really a domestic confl ict between interest constituencies in the onshore countries 
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(Rixen, 2012). This is why as is obvious from tables 2 and 3, even major onshore 
fi nancial centres such as New York and Tokyo have sought to capitalize on the 
demand for offshore services by instituting distinct offshore markets within 
their own jurisdictions. What is more, the situation is now further complicated 
by the rise of new emerging economic powers in the world scene. According 
to Sharman (2012), most tax havens have continued to thrive or at the very 
least have been able to resist the recent campaigns against them, by effectively 
capitalizing on a new great source of demand for their services, which is none 
other than the corporate entities and the “new rich” of emerging markets such 
as China, Brazil and India. In these circumstances, it should come as no surprise 
that recent multilateral initiatives against tax havens have not really led to any 
fundamental changes and that despite the increasing politicization of the issue 
by civil society movements, an abolition of tax havens in the foreseeable future 
is not forthcoming (Rixen, 2008). 
4. Offshore Finance and the Global Financial System
From above, it is obvious that the offshore has become an integral part of the global economic system, altering the traditional dynamics of the core-
periphery continuum. The two poles of the system are economically and legally 
interconnected and interpenetrated to such a degree that often this dichotomy is 
rendered meaningless. In fi nance, this is more evident than in any other area of 
economic activity. As we saw previously, in the aftermath of the crisis the onshore 
– offshore dichotomy has been raised to the forefront of policy debates. In the area 
of fi nance, the increased attention to this dichotomy is because the crisis revealed 
an entire section of the global fi nancial system, which operated unregulated and 
unsupervised, the so-called shadow banking system. This system includes various 
institutions that perform the functions of traditional fi nancial intermediaries 
(maturity, credit and liquidity transformation) but without being subject to the 
same regulatory requirements and supervision, or public protection privileges 
such as access to central bank liquidity or government guarantees (Pozsar et al., 
2012). Moreover, while typically associated in some way with onshore fi nancial 
institutions, in many cases these shadow banks operate out of offshore fi nancial 
centres further eschewing regulatory control and supervision. In all cases, there 
are strong indications that the operation of the shadow banking system facilitates 
tax evasion and avoidance for individual and institutional residents of developed 
countries’ jurisdictions and reduces signifi cantly the tax burden of a wide array 
of fi nancial institutions at the expense of taxpayers in the onshore jurisdictions. 
Although most analyses have looked at the practices of the shadow banking 
institutions and the fi nancial instruments they produced and supplied to the 
global fi nancial system (Acharya and Richardson, 2009; Adrian and Shin, 2009; 
Pozsar et al. 2012), recent work has also pointed to the crucial role played by the 
institutions that created the demand for the products of shadow banks (Acharya 
and Schnabl, 2010; Pozsar and Singh, 2011; Pozsar, 2011). For example, a major 
driver for the growth of the shadow banking system has been the emergence of 
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large institutional cash pools, that is “large, centrally managed, short-term cash 
balances of global non-fi nancial corporations and institutional investors such as 
asset managers, securities lenders and pension funds” (Pozsar, 2011:4). These 
institutional cash pools display an ever increasing demand for safe, high-quality, 
liquid, short-term debt instruments which cannot be satisfi ed neither by partially 
insured deposits nor by government guaranteed short-term instruments. The 
gap has been fi lled by short-term debt instruments which combine liquidity, 
satisfactory yields and capital safety, as they are privately insured (for example 
repurchase agreements - repos, asset-backed commercial paper - ABCP - and 
money market tranches of asset-backed securities – ABS), (Pozsar, 2011). One 
of the most signifi cant reasons for the creation of these large institutional cash 
pools is the high demand for the long-term securities in which asset managers 
routinely invest in. These assets are in demand as a source of collateral for 
broker-dealers and universal banks (security borrowers) in order to be re-used 
for other purposes and they are usually exchanged for cash (for example through 
the use of reverse repos), which then is invested in short-term debt instruments 
as described above (Pozsar and Singh, 2011).
In terms of the tax implications of the demand side of the shadow banking 
system, a major problem lies with the fact that the funds that form these 
institutional cash pools are often concentrated and centrally managed (by 
specialized asset management companies) in low-tax jurisdictions or tax havens, 
eschewing thus taxation in the countries where the initial funds came from (e.g. 
the country where the headquarters of a non-fi nancial corporation is located, or 
the country of origin of a high net worth individual, whose family offi ce is set up 
as an offshore legal entity). This problem is further complicated by the fact that 
as mentioned above, these institutional cash pools do not invest in traditional 
M2 measures of money such as certifi cates of deposit, savings and checking 
accounts, time deposits etc. Rather they invest their cash balances into privately 
secured short-term debt instruments, which are very hard to monitor accurately, 
as the related transactions span the global fi nancial system, and the result is 
invested positions into instruments which are in effect cash-equivalent but do 
not appear in bank cash balances. Therefore, even in cases where international 
agreements could force offshore jurisdictions to report, or at least collect tax from 
bank balances of individuals and companies (even less likely), this type of wealth 
would probably neither be reported nor taxed. 
On the supply side, shadow banks perform credit intermediation. However, 
credit intermediation in the shadow banking system is securitization-based and 
depends on the wholesale funding by money market funds and the institutional 
cash pools and asset managers referred to above. The main feature of securitized 
credit intermediation is that in contrast to traditional banking intermediation 
the process takes place in a number of steps typically performed by a number of 
different institutions (Pozsar et al., 2012). The result is long credit intermediation 
chains, which link banks, broker-dealers, insurers, limited purpose fi nance 
companies, money market funds, institutional cash pools and asset managers 
into a complex process of credit, liquidity, maturity and reverse maturity 
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transformation. It is evident that these intermediation chains straddle both the 
offi cial and the shadow banking systems. A major link between the two systems 
is the establishment of a wide array of structured investment vehicles (SIVs), 
special purpose vehicles (SPVs) and funds that are typically off-balance sheet 
subsidiaries of universal banks and/ or major broker dealers, often incorporated 
in tax havens and offshore fi nancial centres. It is obvious that this global 
network of off-balance sheet subsidiaries allows individuals and companies to 
hide earned income from their home jurisdictions, while also operating as a huge 
transfer pricing mechanism for the global fi nancial system, reducing fi nancial 
institutions’ own tax bill. Monitoring is particularly diffi cult given the volume 
and geographical scope of these transactions, as well as the fact that a large part 
of the shadow banking system has been operating on an over-the-counter (OTC) 
basis, away from organized exchanges, with little information publicly available.
From the brief analysis of the demand and supply of the shadow banking 
system, it becomes obvious that it straddles both the onshore and offshore 
worlds by relocating funds and the institutional vehicles through which these 
are managed to OFCs, while the benefi ciaries remain on the shore. These 
benefi ciaries, which include some of the world’s most prestigious fi nancial 
institutions, non-fi nance corporations and businessmen, are hidden by long 
intermediation chains, which interconnect a wide array of diverse institutional 
vehicles, making it virtually impossible to trace, regulate and tax the fl ow of 
wealth through the global fi nancial system. It is evident, that the emergence of 
the shadow banking system, is not only the result of the actions of some small, 
remote and secretive jurisdictions at the far reaches of the globe; the fi nancial 
imbalances that led the global fi nancial crisis, including the growth of a virtually 
unregulated parallel universe of fi nancial activities, have been the result of 
regulatory forbearance, deliberate policy choices and ideological and normative 
rigidities in developed countries, without which the complex interpenetration 
between the onshore and the offshore worlds would not have been possible. 
5. Conclusions
This article has sought to examine the changing dynamics between the periphery and the core of the world economy. Small, peripheral states have 
assumed an increasingly important role in recent decades by offering fi nancial 
services to an increasing and geographically expanding range of corporate entities 
and wealthy individuals. Technological interconnectedness and capital mobility 
have made this possible, as these are in effect virtual fi nancial services, between 
institutions related to the same benefi ciaries but located in different jurisdictions. 
These activities have harmful consequences for non-OFC countries, which are 
typically much larger, wealthier and powerful than OFCs and tax havens. 
However, despite these consequences and the power asymmetry between OFCs 
in the periphery and countries at the core of the global economy, the former seem 
to defy the pressure of the latter. This is because, fi rst, the OFCs take advantage 
of the principle of legal separation of the subject, which is deeply ingrained in the 
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structure of the modern state system, and whose negation could create serious 
practical, but also political and ethical challenges for the latter, particularly in an 
era of economic interdependence and interpenetration. Secondly, these economic 
circumstances have linked the offshore world in intricate and multi-layered 
ways with the onshore, making the regulation of the former impossible without 
a comparable regulatory reform of the latter. This is where the true diffi culty in 
campaigns against OFCs lies; in effect, the regulation of both the onshore and 
the offshore are really an issue of balancing interest groups in the core countries. 
The distribution of resources between these groups do not leave much room for 
hope that OFCs’ practices are coming soon to an end, despite the proclamations of 
statesmen in the core countries and international organizations to the contrary. 
Besides, the emergence of new economic powers, whose rising corporations and 
new rich seek to share in the benefi ts of offshore services, is likely to complicate 
things further by expanding the web of onshore-offshore interlinkages and adding 
another layer of clashing interests over the operation of the OFCs.
Notes
1. Both tax evasion and avoidance aim at reducing the tax burden of an individual 
or a company. The difference is that evasion takes place through illegal prac-
tices such as hiding income, while avoidance employs legal instruments and 
loopholes to achieve the same result without violating the letter of the law. 
2. The list has been named after the former French Minister of Finance Chris-
tine Lagarde (currently Director of the International Monetary Fund – IMF), 
who gave the list to her Greek counterpart in 2010. 
3. See for example “US groups grilled over low tax payments”, Financial Times, 
12 November 2012 and “France considers broad tax clampdown on web com-
panies”, Reuters, 14 November 2012.
4. G20 Declaration on Strengthening the Financial System, London, 2 April 2009. 
5. London may be an exception, as it is the world’s largest centre for non-resi-
dent fi nancial activity. Still, to a large degree this is the result of its deep and 
liquid capital markets and its sophistication in terms of legal procedures and 
market infrastructure and not the result of a deliberate strategy to develop 
an OFC; it is what Palan calls a ”spontaneous” offshore cite (Palan, 1998).
6. The model here is Switzerland, which was the fi rst to develop very strong 
laws for the protection of banking secrecy.
7. Although such a distinction could be valid based on the size and sophistica-
tion of the domestic economies of these jurisdictions, their categorization as 
OFRCs or tax havens should not be in doubt, given that Hong Kong, Singa-
pore and Switzerland have been listed as such in nine out of eleven major 
international studies, while Ireland has been included in eight studies. For a 
comprehensive overview, see Palan et al. 2010. 
8. See full list for external positions of banks by nationality of reporting country 
available at: http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qa1212_anx2a.pdf. 
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9. Available from the BIS website at: http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qa1212_
anx7a.pdf. 
10. While there are no reliable fi gures for global tax losses, evidence from indi-
vidual countries suggests that it is substantial. For example, studies have es-
timated the tax gap (that is, the difference between declared profi ts and paid 
taxes and actual taxes paid) at 2% of GDP for the United States and 2-2.5% 
for the EU (Palan et al. 2010: 66).
11 Emphasis in the original. 
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